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Social capital and regional economic growth 
 
Abstract 
We study a cross-section of 54 European regions in the period 1950-1998. The central question is whether social 
capital, in the form of generalized trust and associational activity, is related to regional differences in economic 
growth. Based on extensive robustness tests, we present evidence that social capital measured as associational 
activity  is  positively  related  to  growth  differentials  in  European  regions.  Hence,  our  results  suggest  that 
Putnam’s (1993) thesis on social capital in Italian regions can be generalized. Our analysis also suggests that it 
is not only the mere existence of network relationships that stimulates regional economic growth, but also the 
level of actual involvement in these relationships.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, economists show an increased interest in the role of social capital in relation to 
economic development. New or modern growth theory has resulted in a number of empirical studies, 
in which traditional inputs capital and labor are complemented with human capital and indicators that 
proxy  institutional  and  geographical  differences between  countries.  Since  the  pioneering  work  of 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Baumol (1986), Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1991), and Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992) growth empirics have become rather popular. However, as Temple (1999) 
argues, despite this stream of research there is only limited progression in this field. He concludes his 
impressive survey of empirical growth literature by arguing that there is a role for research on the 
broad relation between culture and economics. He writes: ‘Some of the most interesting thinking on 
economic growth is to be found on the borders of political science and sociology’ (Temple 1999, 
146). Temple and Johnson reach a similar conclusion when stating that ‘there are many possible 
reasons why society might matter, and their investigation should be a worthwhile direction for further 
research’ (Temple and Johnson 1998, 987). 
An  influential  contribution  to  the  discussion  on  the  relation  between  social  capital  and 
economic development is the publication of “Making democracy work” by Putnam, Leonardi and 
Nanetti in 1993. These authors study Italian regions and find that social capital matters in explaining 
the regional differences in economic and institutional (government) performance. Putnam et al. (1993, 
167) define social capital as those ‘features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions’. The Worldbank uses a 
similar definition. According to the Worldbank, social capital refers to the norms and networks that 
enable collective action. It refers to the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of a society’s social interactions
1. 
In addition to standard economic variables, social capital is considered an important factor in 
explaining economic success, a statement that we choose to refer to as the Putnam hypothesis. Besides 
Putnam et al. (1993), Fukuyama (1995) has emphasized the importance of social capital. He argues 
that social capital in the form of non-family or generalized trust is of crucial importance for successful 
performance in advanced economies. As becomes clear in Putnam et al.’s definition of social capital, 
trust and networks are seen as dimensions of social capital. Where Putnam et al. (1993) stress the role 
of networks, Fukuyama (1995) stresses the role of trust. 
A number of studies has appeared on the concept of social capital since then (Fukuyama 
1995a; Granato et al. 1996; Helliwell 1996; Swank 1996; Inglehart 1997; Fedderke et al. 1999; Paxton 
1999, 2002; Van Deth et al., 1999; Inkeles 2000; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Piazza-
Georgi, 2002; Zak and Knack, 2001; Durlauf, 2002; Francois, 2002). However, empirical studies that 
focus on the question if the Putnam hypothesis can be generalized are scarce. Though the concept of 
                                                           
1 See http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/   4
social capital is intuitively highly appealing, it is hard to measure it empirically, and there is little 
systematic  quantitative  evidence  on  social  capital  (Paldam  and  Svendsen,  2000).  Moreover,  as 
Woolcock (1998) puts it, vagueness has plagued social capital scholarship. There are a number of 
concepts that are used in similar ways as social capital, like social infrastructure (Hall and Jones 1999) 
and social capability (Abramowitz 1986; Temple and Johnson 1998).  The indicators used in the 
literature on social capital are often trust and social participation. A key empirical paper relating 
social capital with economic growth is Knack and Keefer’s study (1997). Nevertheless, as Beugelsdijk 
et al. (2002) have shown, the statistical robustness of their study is limited. The question if social 
capital in terms of generalized trust and associational activity influences economic growth is still not 
answered.  The  core  question  remains  if  Putnam  et  al.’s  (1993)  study  on  Italian  regions  can  be 
generalized.  
Besides great academic and journalistic attention, policy makers also show increased interest 
in the concept of social capital. According to the European Committee and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) the endowment of social capital in the form of business culture and shared norms of 
behavior is of particular importance for regional development (EIB 2000; EC 1999). “The need, in 
sum, is for a long term strategy which addresses simultaneously the many aspects of the problem of a 
lack of competitiveness and attempt to build up the social capital of a region in parallel with its 
physical infrastructure, the skills of its work force and its productive base” (EIB 2000, 20). Research 
on the relationship between social capital and regional economic development in the EU may have 
consequences for the allocation of the structural funds. At the moment, there is too little known about 
social capital, its functions and the impact on economic growth to formulate clear policy implications.  
From a policy point of view it is therefore important to find empirical evidence for the role of social 
capital in regional economic development. 
This paper presents an analysis of the relation between social capital and economic growth for 
European  regions.  We  build  on  two  strands  of  literature,  i.e.  the  explanation  of  regional  growth 
differentials in Europe as developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and the discussion on the 
economic payoff of social capital as discussed by Knack and Keefer (1997) and later continued by 
Zak and Knack (2001). By doing so, we are able to test Putnam et al.’s hypothesis on an analogous 
sub-national level used in their study
2. The data we use to measure social capital at the regional level 
in Europe are unique
3.  
Our study has two major findings. First, we do not find that on a regional level trust and 
growth are associated with each other. Second, associational activity and in specific active -unpaid- 
voluntary work is positively related to regional economic growth.  
                                                           
2 There is small difference however. Putnam et al. analyse regions on a different level than we do. Where we use 
the NUTS1 level (resulting in 11 regions), Putnam et al. apply another definition resulting in 20 regions. In line 
with Putnam et al. we study sub-units of a country. 
3 Currently the OECD has established a ‘think tank’ of specialists that have been brought together with the aim 
of discussing the available instruments and/or develop new instruments that measure social capital.    5
The outline of the paper is as follows. First we summarize theory on social capital and how it 
is perceived in the literature. Thereby, we focus on trust and group membership. We describe several 
functions  of  trust  and  argue  that  trust  fulfils  different  functions  at  different  stages  of  economic 
development. Besides as a substitute for a well-functioning institutional system, trust can be seen as a 
necessary element in complex transactions with incomplete contracts. The second element of social 
capital we discuss is group membership. Then we turn to statistical analyses, and test if trust and 
group-membership are related to regional economic growth. After an extensive robustness analysis, 
we conclude with suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Trust 
In  general,  trust can  be seen  as  the  perception  and  interpretation  of the other’s  expected 
dependability. Trust is based upon the expectation that one will find what is expected. Trust is the 
mutual  expectation  that  arises  within  a  community  of  regular,  cooperative  behavior,  based  on 
commonly shared norms (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000, 342). It refers to the confidence that a partner 
will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the other (Gambetta 1988). Several authors have shown the 
importance  of  trust  in  economic  transactions.  These  studies  can  be  seen  as  an  extension  of 
Williamson’s (1975, 1985, 1998) transaction cost theory. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) have shown 
that  informal,  personal  connections  between  and  across  organizations  play  an  important  role  in 
determining the governance structures used to organize their transactions. Gulati (1995) pointed to the 
fact that both transaction cost elements as well as social factors are relevant and important in studying 
inter-firm  relationships  and  co-operation.  Repeated  ties  between  firms  engender  trust  that  is 
manifested in the form of the contracts used to organize subsequent alliances. Trust within social 
networks provides options for control through third parties and serves therefore as a substitute for a 
legal system. This function is related to the reduction of transaction costs, the costs of running the 
economic system. Moreover, trust is linked with the facilitation of highly uncertain and complex 
transactions. It reduces the uncertainty of these kinds of transactions. Uzzi (1996) shows in a study on 
the apparel industry in New York that trust facilitates the exchange of resources and information that 
are crucial for high performance but are difficult to value and transfer via market ties. This second 
function of trust is related to its information function. As Malecki puts it (2000, 195) ‘through the 
economic and social relationship in the network, diverse information becomes inexpensive to obtain’. 
When discussing alliances, Gulati (1998, 308) argues that ‘trust not only enables greater exchange of 
information, but it also promotes ease of interaction and a flexible orientation on the part of each 
partner’. It operates as a mechanism that facilitates communication and co-operation between firms. 
For example, trust relationships can result in a supplier exceeding contractual requirements, whether 
by  early  delivery,  higher  quality,  or some  other  means  of  assuring  goodwill  (Sako  1992).  Or  as 
Williamson (1985, 62) states ‘where personal integrity is believed to be operative, individuals [..] may 
refuse to be part of opportunistic efforts to take advantage of the letter of the contract when the spirit   6
of  the  exchange  is  emasculated’.  Nooteboom  (1999)  even  reasons  that  too  detailed  and  formal 
contracts may seriously inhibit the growth of trust. Trust and contractual safeguards are to some 
degree substitutes. Among those who see trust as a substitute for rules and contracts, Kenneth Arrow 
(1971, 22) is perhaps the most explicit:  
 
“It is useful for individuals to have some trust in each other’s word. In the absence of trust, it would 
become very costly to arrange for alternative sanctions and guarantees, and many opportunities for 
mutually beneficial co-operation would have to be foregone”. (emphasis added) 
 
According  to  Fukuyama  (1995),  societies endowed  with  generalized  trust  enjoy  a  form  of  social 
capital, that - complementary to traditional factor endowments like labor and capital - contributes at 
least as much to their success in modern economic competition. Generalized trust is based on a set of 
ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations internalized by members of a community (Fukuyama 
1995). High trust societies can do with fewer regulations and coercive enforcement mechanisms. In 
this view, trust is seen as a substitute for contracts. But in case an institutional system functions 
properly, the function of trust should be seen in the light of the facilitation of complex transactions. It 
lowers transaction costs and moreover, it contributes to flexibility. Fukuyama argues that non-family 
or generalized trust is therefore of importance for successful performance in advanced economies.  
First, trust allows for the dis-embedding of social relations and second, trust allows for co-operation 
without the direct influence of power and market. Korczynski (2000) argues that these two functions 
are of crucial importance to advanced capitalist economies given their increasingly globalised and 
turbulent nature. Thus, trust not only serves as a substitute for legal systems, but also functions as a 
facilitator of complex transactions that even in case of a well-functioning institutional system cannot 
be fully ‘arranged’ in terms of contracts.  
Hence, in general the economic function of trust refers to the reduction of transaction costs 
and its influence on promoting co-operation and reducing the need (costs) for intervention to prevent 
or  correct  dishonesty.  But  also  from  a  sociological  point  of  view,  trust  has  several  functions. 
Especially Parsons’ (1969) study and Luhmanns’ (1979) study are important in this respect. Parsons 
places trust in the center of the construction of social order. In Parsons’ view, a common value system 
based on widely shared norms and values, stabilizes interactions in a social system. Trust is grounded 
in pre-existing consensus and is a product of an effective integration of norms and values. Trust fulfils 
an  integrative  function  in  the  establishment  of  social  order.  The  second  function  of  trust  in 
sociological  thinking  has  been  put  forward  by  Luhmann  in  1979.  He  views  trust  as  a  social 
mechanism  that  reduces  complexity  and  enables  individuals  to  deal  with  the  complexity  and 
contingency  of  modern  life.  This  corresponds  with  Williamson’s  (1985)  argument  that  exchange 
relations that feature personal trust will survive greater stress and will display greater adaptability. 
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3. Group membership 
Regarding the function of associational activity and its link to economic growth, theory is less 
clear than with respect to trust (Bertrand et al. 2000). We distinguish two functions of associational 
activity or group membership on welfare. 
Putnam et al. (1993) show that networks relationships improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions. Their study on Italian regions has shown that the critical factor in 
explaining effectiveness of regional governments and regional economic performance in Italy is to be 
found in regional differences in social structure. Effective governance hinges critically on traditions of 
civic engagement and the structure of the civic networks. In regions where social relationships are 
more horizontal, based on trust and shared values, participation in social organizations is higher and 
social  capital  is  higher.  They  conclude  that  regions,  in  which  the  regional  government  is  more 
successful and  the  economy  is  more  efficient,  are  characterized  by  horizontal  relations  that  both 
favored and fostered greater networks of civic engagement and levels of organization in society. The 
reason Putnam et al. specifically study the degree of civic community membership is that ‘Citizens in 
a civic community, though not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more than a battleground 
for pursuing personal interest’ (Putnam et al. 1993, 88). In this way fewer resources are used incurring 
transaction costs. Or as Leonardi (1995, 169) writes, high social capital means that citizens accept the 
positive role played by collective action (organized group behavior) in pursuing collective goods. 
The second function of associational activity is closely related to the theory of networks and 
the  advantages  of  being  embedded  in  networks.  There  are  two  theoretical  approaches  for 
understanding how social relations and networks create economic and social benefits (Gargiulo and 
Benassi 2000; Uzzi 1999). The weak-tie approach argues that a large network of arm’s-length ties is 
most advantageous. On the other hand there is the strong-tie approach claiming that a closed tightly 
knit network of embedded ties is most advantageous. This corresponds with the two opposite views in 
literature on the optimal structure of networks. Whereas Coleman (1990) argues that closed networks 
may provide a better basis for co-operation, Burt (1992) stresses cohesive ties as a source of rigidity. 
However, in both cases the core of the argument relates to the transfer of knowledge between actors. 
In Burt’s (1992) concept, structural holes are important sources of new information. A fundamental 
idea that inspired Burt’s structural-hole theory is Granovetter’s description of the “strength of weak 
ties” (Granovetter 1973). Granovetter reasoned that access to new information is obtained through an 
ego’s weak ties to nodes at a distance from his own local network. The reasoning is that information 
within the local network is widely shared locally, hence most of the local contacts are redundant. New 
information comes from non-redundant ties. 
Though Coleman’s closed network approach seems to be opposite to Burt’s view of structural 
holes (open networks), Coleman states that exactly the closure of the network and the embeddedness 
of the actors provide opportunities to obtain information that otherwise would be impossible or too   8
expensive  to  obtain.  In  both  views,  embeddedness  in  networks  creates  advantages  like  increased 
sources of information, and obtaining information that is not easily available (spillover effects). 
In sum, the economic function of associational activity contains two elements. The first refers 
to the concept of collective action and argues that organized group behavior may lead to the generally 
shared idea that the pursuit of collective goods is not seen as contradictory to the achievement of 
personal wealth. Associational activity limits the costs of free riding. Secondly, embeddedness in 
networks  (group  membership) promotes the  spillover  of  knowledge  and  information  between  the 
different actors involved. 
 
4. Empirical test 
In  order  to  test  if  social  capital  influences  regional  economic  growth,  we  investigate  54 
European regions. By doing so, we are able to test if Putnam’s thesis on social capital based on Italian 
regions can be generalized. In addition, there are other advantages of investigating regions in Europe. 
First  of  all,  the  set  of  regions  is  relatively  homogeneous  compared  with  studies  on  culture  and 
economic development that incorporate countries like Taiwan and Germany or Japan and the United 
States  in the  same regression analysis. Temple’s critical  comment  (1999) that  countries differing 
widely in social, political and institutional characteristics are unlikely to fall on a common surface, is 
heeded  by  taking  this  relatively  homogeneous  set  of  European  regions.  A  second  advantage  of 
studying regions is the number of observations. Instead of only 29 countries (e.g. Knack and Keefer 
1997), we study 54 regions. Most important, however, is the fact that by comparing national cultures, 
‘we risk losing track of the enormous diversity found within many of the major nations of the world’ 
(Smith and Bond 1998, 41). By studying regions and regional differences this risk is limited. 
 
5. Data 
Data on social capital are taken from the European Value Studies (EVS), which is a survey on 
norms and values. The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey 
research  program  on  basic  human  values,  initiated by the European Value  Systems Study  Group 
(EVSSG) in the late 1970s. The EVS aimed at designing and conducting a major empirical study of 
the  moral  and  social  values  underlying  European  social  and  political  institutions  and  governing 
conduct.  Its  coordination  centre  is  located  at  Tilburg  University,  The  Netherlands
4.  By  now,  the 
survey comprises three waves (1981/1990/1999), of which we use the second one. In order to obtain 
regional scores on our indicators of social capital we had to regroup the original individual data. We 
could not use the first wave that was carried out in 1981, because we could not trace the individual 
scores in terms of regions. The latest wave, 1999/2000 was not completed by the time we finished this 
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non-culturally biased estimates (e.g. backward translation procedures), are extensively discussed at the website 
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paper. Moreover, we want to use indicators of social capital that date back to the starting point of our 
period of analysis as much as possible. Therefore we use the 1990 data. The set comprises 7 countries, 
i.e. France, Italy, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. In order to 
compare the data on norms and values with regional economic data we used the Eurostat definition of 
regions. The regional level in our analyses is the NUTS1 level. This implies that France consists of 8 
regions,  Italy  11,  Germany  11  (former  eastern  regions  excluded),  Spain  7,  The  Netherlands  4, 
Belgium 3, and the UK 10 (including Scotland, excluding Northern Ireland). The total number of 
regions equals 54 (see figure 1). The numbers of the European regions are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
<Insert figure 1 about here> 
 
<Insert table 1 about here> 
 
6. Trust 
The question we used to asses the level of trust in a society is: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”. 
After deleting the number of respondents that answered “don’t know”, we took the fraction of people 
that answered “most people can be trusted”.  
For our sample of 54 regions we have obtained scores on trust. These scores range from 5.5% 
of the respondents answering that most people can be trusted in Sardegna in Southern Italy to 64.6% 
in the eastern part of the Netherlands. Mean score equals 0.35 with a standard deviation of 0.11. In 
figure 2 the scores on percentage of people answering that most people can be trusted are shown. 
 
<Insert figure 2 about here> 
 
As can be seen in figure 2, the regional scores on trust differ considerably within Europe. 
When looking at countries, we see for example that The Netherlands are rather homogeneous in terms 
of trust, but regions in Italy differ a lot. Putnam et al. (1993) seemed right in the case of Italy, when 
describing the differences between the Northern and the Southern  regions. The  North  has  higher 
scores on trust than the South. However, at first sight such a picture for Europe as a whole cannot be 
obtained. While some researchers have suggested that religion, especially Protestantism, correlates 
with trust (e.g., Inglehart 1990, Knack and Keefer 1997, 1283), our regional analysis suggests this is 
not the case. Traditional Catholic regions in the South of the Netherlands, Flanders, Madrid and the   10
North of Italy all fall in the group of regions that have the highest scores on trust (0.447-0.646)
5, far 
above average (see figure 2).  
 
7. Group membership 
Besides interest in general trust, Putnam et al. (1993) explicitly studied memberships of clubs 
and associations. They suggested that dense horizontal networks positively affect the level of trust and 
citizenship
6. As mentioned earlier, social capital is often perceived in terms of networks and being 
member of such a group or network. Similar to Knack and Keefer (1997), we measure the average 
number of groups cited per respondent in each region. However, as Knack and Keefer also argue, the 
level of involvement is not measured, which may reduce the validity of this measure of social capital. 
The  hypothesized  benefits  of  network  embeddedness  may  not  be  captured  when  taking  passive 
membership of groups and associations. Therefore, we have decided to measure active membership of 
a number of associations next to our measure of passive membership. The question we use to measure 
group membership, is stated as follows: ‘which, if any do you belong to?’. The categories are: 
a)  Social welfare services for elderly handicapped or deprived people 
b)  Religious or church organizations  
c)  Education, arts, music or cultural activities  
d)  Trade unions  
e)  Political parties or groups 
f)  Local community action  
g)  Third world development or human rights 
h)  Conservation, the environment, ecology  
i)  Professional associations  
j)  Youth work 
k)  Sports or recreation 
l)  Women’s groups  
m)  Peace movement  
n)  Animal rights  
o)  Voluntary organizations concerned with health   
The above categories are the same for our measures of passive and active group membership. 
The difference between the two is that in case of active membership respondents are not only a 
member but also do voluntary work for the particular association. As described earlier and in line with 
Putnam  et  al.  (1993),  we think  of  the  level  of  doing  unpaid  voluntary  work  as  an  indication  of 
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6  This argument is not new. Already in 1835 Tocqueville argued that membership in voluntary associations was 
conducive to democracy. Putnam (1993) however extends the argument and argues that voluntary associations 
are not only conducive to democracy, but also to economic development.   11
collective feelings of responsibility. As such these moral norms may have positive effects on the 
provision of public goods. Moreover, as we argued in the previous section on network theory, these 
networks may provide spillover channels (Oerlemans et al., 2001). The scores are obtained by taking 
the average score per region of respondents answering yes to the question mentioned above
7.  
Besides  the  difference  between  active  and  passive  group  membership,  we  distinguished 
between types of group membership. We follow Knack and Keefer’s distinction between different 
types of associational activity that may have different effects on growth. In line with their analysis we 
made a distinction between the so-called Putnam and Olson groups. As already discussed, Putnam 
(1993) argued that the economic success of northern Italian regions can be attributed to its richer 
associational life, because associations ‘instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and 
public-spiritedness’ (1993, 89). Olson (1983), on the other hand observes that associational activity 
may hurt growth because of rent-seeking activities. According to Olson, many of these associations 
may act as special interest groups lobbying for preferential policies that impose disproportionate costs 
on  society  (see also Knack and  Keefer,  1997). In sum, whereas  Putnam  groups may be  evoking 
positive effects, these may be reduced by harmful effects of the Olson groups.  
We have calculated regional scores on the Putnam and Olson groups corresponding to Knack 
and Keefer’s analysis at a country level. The Putnam groups refer to membership of b) religious 
organizations, c) education, arts, music or cultural activities and j) youth work. The Olson groups 
consist  of  membership  of  d)  trade  unions,  e)  political  parties  of  groups,  and  i)  professional 
associations. For  reasons of  clarity, we depicted  an overview of the different  measures  of  social 
capital in figure 3. 
 
<Insert figure 3 about here> 
  
Regarding the question on unpaid voluntary work (active group membership) we obtained an 
average score of 0.41 and a standard deviation of 0.17. The highest score is obtained in Bremen, 
Germany (0.82) and the lowest score on active membership can be found in Sardegna (0.08). Figures 
4 and 5 show the scores on the Putnam and Olson Groups respectively.  
 
<Insert figure 4, 5 and 6 about here> 
 
The mean score on the Putnam groups at the regional level is 0.26 with a standard deviation 
of 0.18. The highest score is found in the eastern part of the Netherlands, with a score of 0.89. This 
implies that on average 89% of the people is member of at least one of the organizations included in 
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membership, because of lack of data. In addition to the associations they analyse, we include items k,l,m,n, and 
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the Putnam groups. The lowest score can be found in Sardegna, Italy, where only 3% of the people are 
member of  at  least  one  of  these  organizations. The scores on the Olson groups range form 0 in 
Sardegna (Italy) to 0.55 in the eastern part of the Netherlands. The mean value is 0.22 with a standard 
deviation from 0.12. Table 2 shows the mean scores and the standard deviation for the social capital 
variables.  
The  correlation  between  active  membership  and  Putnam  groups  is  0.7,  between  active 
membership  and Olson groups 0.69 and between active membership and interpersonal trust 0.21. 
Table 3a shows the correlation of the social capital variables. 
 
< Insert table 2 and 3a/b about here > 
 
8. Economic data 
In order to test if trust and group membership are related to economic growth, we have taken 
a standard growth framework, that corresponds with Knack and Keefer’s empirical test, and which 
includes initial level of GDP per capita, the investment ratio and the school enrolment ratio. We 
closely follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) who explain regional growth differentials in Europe 
between 1950 and 1990. As we have more recent economic data, we analyze the period 1950-1998
8.  
As the availability of data on the level of European regions is relatively scarce, the number of 
empirical studies is relatively limited compared to cross-country studies. Similar to Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), we have computed regional growth differentials by relating the regional GDP per 
capita  information  to  the  country  mean
9.  There  are  two  reasons  to  use  the  country  mean  as  a 
correction factor. First of all we do not have regional price data. Second, the figures on regional GDP 
are provided in an index form that is not comparable across countries. Hence, we have used Gross 
Regional Product (GRP) figures that are expressed as deviations from the means from the respective 
countries. An additional advantage of using relative data versus non-relative data is the direct control 
for national growth rates that might bias regional growth rates. The 1950 data are based on Molle, 
Van Holst and Smits (1980), whereas the data for Spain refer to 1955 and are based on Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin’s (1995) calculations.  The 1998 data on GRP are drawn from Eurostat information.  
If we look at the correlations between Growth and the different measures of social capital, we 
observe relatively low correlations. The correlation between Growth and Trust is only 0.05 (see table 
3a). The correlation between Growth and the different measures of group membership is around 0.25 
with the highest correlation of 0.29 between Growth and Active groups membership (see table 3a). 
The correlation table shows that the relationship between our social capital variables and regional 
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9 Gross Regional Product of a region in 1950 is divided by the mean of the Gross Regional Products of all 
regions belonging to a certain country. A similar formula is applied to calculate the 1998 relative regional 
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economic  growth  does  not  seem  to  be  that  strong.  However,  the  question  is  if  this  holds  when 
controlling for other economic variables, like investment in physical capital.  
Investment ratio is measured at country level. Data are taken from the Penn World Tables 5.6. 
The period for which we have calculated the average of the investment ratio is 1950-1992
10. Apart 
from  availability  of  reliable  regional  investment  data
11,  another  reason  to  take  the  country  level 
investment  data  and  not  the  regional  scores,  is  the  underlying  assumption  of  a  closed  economy. 
Because of spatial interaction, regional investment figures would only provide a limited understanding 
of regional economic growth (Nijkamp and Poot 1998). Therefore we have taken the country level 
data.  
School enrolment ratio measures the total number of pupils at first and second level in 1977, 
divided  by  total  number  of  people  in  the  corresponding  age  group.  The  basic  growth  period  we 
analyze is 1950-1998. The school enrolment rate in 1977 falls in between these dates and given the 
fact that school enrolment rates have increased since 1950, the 1977 information is a reasonable proxy 
for the average over the entire period. Data come from Eurostat. Data on school enrolment rates in 
Spanish regions refer to 1985. We have taken uncorrected regional figures because it has been shown 
that migration plays only a minor role in European regions and the relation with per capita GDP is 
weak (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Begg 1995). 
The basis for our analyses is the standard ‘Barro’ type of a growth regression, including the 
investment in physical capital, human capital and the initial level of economic development. In order 
to control for concentration of human capital in major agglomerations, we included a variable that 
consists of the score on the school enrolment rate multiplied by a dummy variable for the region in 
which a major agglomeration is located
12. Furthermore we tested if spatial correlation influences our 
results. Ideally one should use interregional input-output tables to calculate regional multipliers and 
construct  a  variable  that  controls  for  spatial  correlation
13.  However,  this  information  was  not 
available.  In  order  to  control  for  spatial  correlation,  we  applied  Quah’s  (1996)  approach  and 
calculated the so-called neighbor relative income. This method implies that we use average per capita 
income of the surrounding, physically contiguous regions to control for spatial auto-correlation. In our 
sample, however, the 1950 GRP data are related to national average and therefore reflect regional 
welfare  relative  to  country  mean.  By  using  these  data  we  implicitly  assume  that  scores  for 
neighboring regions in foreign countries influence regional growth if the welfare in this neighboring 
region is relatively high compared to their own national average. Of the 54 regions in the sample, 19 
                                                           
10 Penn World Tables 5.6 provides data up to 1992.  
11 Eurostat and Cambridge Econometrics do provide data on Gross Fixed Capital Formation. However, data are 
incomplete for some countries or in time. 
12  We selected the Western part of the Netherlands, Greater Paris, Greater Berlin, Greater London, Barcelona 
area, Brussels, and the Italian region Lazio (Rome). 
13 There exist other ways to have a more refined control variable that can be taken into consideration, for 
example the physical length of abutting boundaries or the physical characteristics of the border terrain. 
However, these kinds of extensions go beyond the scope of the current paper.   14
have  neighboring  regions in countries other  than  the  region’s  own  host itself,  whereas  4  had no 
neighboring regions at all
14.  
Hence, our basic regression analysis includes initial level of welfare, school enrolment rate, 
investment ratio, and the control variables for spatial correlation and the concentration of human 
capital in agglomerations. We have taken log-specifications for the first three variables. The results 
are shown in table 4. 
 
< Insert table 4 about here > 
 
The first model we estimated is the standard model. As the results show, all variables except 
for the school enrolment rate are significant at the 5% level. Schooling is significant at the 10% level. 
The initial level of welfare is negatively related to economic growth, which supports the convergence 
hypothesis. This corresponds with other findings on regional convergence in Europe (Martin and 
Sunley 1998). However, if we take shorter periods of time (e.g. 1970-1998) we cannot find proof for 
the convergence hypothesis. This corresponds with findings on country (Levine and Renelt 1992) and 
regional  level  (Fagerberg  and  Verspagen  1995).  The  period  in  the  eighties  can  be  roughly 
characterized  by  divergence  instead  of  the  observed  convergence  in  the  period  before  (Maurseth 
 +RZHYHU EDVHG RQ RXU VDPSOH ZH FRQFOXGH WKDW IRU WKH RYHUDOO DIWHU ZDU SHULRG WKH -
convergence hypothesis holds, i.e. the growth rate of per capita GDP is negatively related to the 
starting level of per capita GDP. 
To test the hypothesized positive relation between social capital and economic growth, we 
included social capital variables discussed above. First, as shown in the second model specification in 
table 4, we added the scores on generalized trust. The Trust variable is not significant. This might 
seem surprising given the results of Knack and Keefer’s (1997) study on country level in which it was 
found that trust significantly influenced economic growth between 1980 and 1992 in 29 countries. 
However, as has been shown by Beugelsdijk et al. (2002), Knack and Keefer’s findings on trust are 
not statistically robust.  
In the third model we included group membership. In accordance with Knack and Keefer 
(1997) we split up this variable in two sub-groups, namely horizontal networks (Olson groups) and 
vertical networks (Putnam groups). As can be seen in table 4, Putnam Groups are not significant and 
Olson Groups are significant at the 5% level. In the fourth model we include the measure for passive 
group membership. Passive group membership has a significant and positive influence on regional 
growth rate. In the final step we included the variable that indicates active membership. The active 
membership variable is highly significant (1% level) and as a consequence, the resulting model has 
the  highest  variance  explained.  Hence,  active  membership,  doing  unpaid  voluntary  work  is 
                                                           
14 The average number of physical neighbour regions is 3.3, which corresponds with Quah’s score of 3.3.   15
significantly correlated with regional economic growth. The question is whether these findings are 
robust. 
 
9. Robustness test 
In order to test if the above findings are robust, we performed several tests.  First, we tested 
for  multi-collinearity  and  heteroskedasticity.  As  the  results  in  table  4  indicate,  these  do  not 
significantly  influence  the  results.  The  Cook-Weisberg  (CW)  test  for  heteroskedasticity  and  the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for multi-collinearity both indicate that in the models specified in 
table 4, these are not problematic and do not influence the results. However, a sensitivity analysis that 
only consists of test for multi-collinearity and heteroskedasticity is not complete. We choose to extend 
our sensitivity analysis in several ways, among which the recursive method and tests based on the 
Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). 
First, we performed several regression analyses in which the different social capital variables 
are combined. Regarding Trust and the Putnam and Olson groups, results do not change. However, if 
we include both active and passive membership, passive membership becomes insignificant. As the 
correlation between the active and passive membership is 0.85 (see table 3), this is likely to be due to 
multi-collinearity problems. In case we perform a regression analysis in which both passive and active 
group membership are included, multi-collinearity analysis shows that the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for these two variables is larger than 4.9, whereas the rest of the variables do not exceed 1.5. 
Though  rule  of  thumb  reads  that  VIFs  exceeding  10  are  problematic,  we  consider  the  strong 
correlation and the VIF analysis as an indication of problematic multi-collinearity.  
Next,  we  have  applied  the  recursive  method  to  test  if  the  composition  of  the  sample 
influences our results. First we order the 54 observations according to a certain variable. In this case 
we chose for regional economic growth. This means that the first observation is the region with the 
lowest growth rate over the period 1950-1998, and observation 54 is the fastest growing region over 
this period. The recursive  method  implies  that based on the  order  in  which the  observations  are 
represented observations are deleted and the coefficients are estimated based on this smaller sample. 
In figure 7 we have plotted the coefficient of Trust when the order of observations is based on growth, 
according to the second model of table 4. 
 
<Insert figure 7 about here> 
   
  The line in the middle plots the value of the regression coefficient for Trust. The outer lines 
represent  95%  confidence  intervals.  The  horizontal  axis  represents  the  observations,  where 
observation 54 is the fastest growing and observation 1 the slowest growing region. The vertical axis 
represents the value of the Trust coefficient at a certain number of observations. If 54 observations are 
included the value of the Trust coefficient equals 0.011, which can be seen in the figure on the far   16
right of the horizontal axis and corresponds to the results in table 4. Moving from the right to the left 
on the horizontal axis means deleting regions that are the fastest growing. For example, observation 
50  implies  that  the  4  fastest  growing  regions  are  deleted.  The  corresponding  value  of  the  Trust 
coefficient based on the sample of 50 regions is close to 0.011. The stable line in figure 7 leads us to 
conclude  that  the  Trust  coefficient  is  independent  of  the  deletion  –or  inclusion-  of  fast  growing 
regions in the sample.  
We  performed  similar  tests  for  the  other  variables,  that  all  behaved  in  a  stable  way  or 
according to economic theory. In the latter case we refer to the initial level of welfare. Inclusion of 
fast growing regions causes the coefficient of initial level of welfare to decrease (more negative), 
which corresponds to the convergence hypothesis. Figure 8 represents the results of the recursive 
method for the variable that measures active group membership, according to the fifth model of table 
4. Observations are again ordered according to regional economic growth. As the figure shows, the 
coefficient of active group membership slightly increases when faster growing regions are included.  
 
<Insert figure 8 about here> 
 
A final step in our robustness analysis is the test whether the variables in our model fulfil the 
weak and – or strong Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) test. The program that is available to perform 
this robustness test is called MetaGrowth and was developed against the background of the robustness 
discussion in growth literature
15. The Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) has been developed by Leamer 
(1985). It labels a relationship between an independent variable and an explanatory variable Xi as 
robust  if  the  relationship  is  of  the  same  sign  and  statistically  significant  for  any  possible  model 
specification. However, subsequent analysis relaxed this requirement. Sala-i-Martin (1997) introduced 
the criterion that the relationship should be significant in at least 95% of the cases, which has become 
known as the weak EBA test.  
The  procedure  we  applied  consists  of  several  rounds,  in  which  we  test  all  possible 
combinations of the explanatory variables
16. For each variable, the program calculates the fraction of 
significant results. The strong EBA test is fulfilled when a value of 1 is achieved. This means that a 
variable has the same sign and is statistically significant in all possible model specifications. The 
weak EBA-test is fulfilled when the above holds in at least 95% of the cases. If we choose to regress 
on all possible combinations of the explanatory variables, we estimate 512 regression models. If we 
limit the number of combinations by running regression models that always include initial level of 
welfare and exclude the combination of passive and active membership, the number of models that 
can  be  run  is  limited  to  32.  Based  on  this  extensive  robustness  analyses,  we  conclude  that  two 
                                                           
15 More information on the package can be found at http://www.feweb.vu.nl/re/MasterPoint/  
16 As this procedure yields a number of tables, we have decided to discuss the results and not include all output 
that was generated. Tables are shown in the statistical appendix and/or available upon request.   17
variables fulfil the strong EBA test when explaining regional economic growth in the period 1950-
1998. These two variables are level of welfare in 1950 and (active) membership, as an indicator of 
social capital.  
Instead of this linear procedure to test for robustness, it is more common to test the robustness 
of the regression results using a stepwise procedure that is available in most statistical packages. 
When applying the stepwise method in STATA and starting from an empty model, the same result is 
achieved as the result using MetaGrowth. In both cases, initial level of welfare and active membership 
are variables that are 100% robust. In sum, our extensive robustness analysis shows that regarding the 




Economists show increased interest in the concept of social capital. An important study in this 
field of social capital is Putnam’s study on Italian regions. He showed that differences in economic 
performance and the well functioning of the institutions in Northern and Southern Italy can be traced 
back to differences in social capital.  
In this paper we build on regional growth empirics as developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995)  and  the  social  capital  debate  to  which  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)  made  an  important 
contribution. We studied 54 regions in Europe and applied a standard economic model to test if the 
Putnam hypothesis can be generalized. The dataset we use is unique, in the sense that it has so far not 
been possible to measure social capital at the European regional level. Social capital is operationalized 
in terms of generalized trust and associational activity, split up in several elements. Similar to Knack 
and Keefer (1997) we made a distinction between Putnam groups and Olson groups, and in addition 
we distinguished active and passive membership. 
We  have  reached  several  conclusions.  First,  we  found  that  for  the  after-war  period  the 
convergence hypothesis at the regional level holds. Second, we could not find robust proof for the 
significant  influence  of  investments  and  regional  school  enrolment  rates  on  regional  economic 
growth.  Third,  our  results  suggest  that  social  capital  in  terms  of  trust  is  not  directly  related  to 
economic growth at the regional level in Europe. Fourth, in line with Knack and Keefer (1997) we 
also find that the distinction between Putnam and Olson Groups does not yield additional insights. 
The findings on Olson Groups are not robust. However, the main implication of our study is that we 
found  that  social  capital  in  terms  of  (active)  group  membership  is  positively  related  to  regional 
economic growth in Europe.  
We have shown the hypothesis put forward by Putnam et al. (1993) that social capital matters 
for regional economic success in Italy, can be generalized to the extent that it is not only the existence 
of  social  networks  that  contribute  to  regional  economic  growth,  but  also  the  actual  level  of   18
involvement  in  it.  Our  regional  analysis  does  not  support  the  hypothesis  that  trust  is  positively 
correlated with economic growth.  
Our  findings  regarding  active  membership  may  have  implications  for  policymakers.  We 
showed  that  social  capital  in  terms  of  active  volunteering  work  is  positively  related  to  regional 
economic growth. Does this mean that governments may want to increase active membership of all 
kinds of associations? Does this imply that policymakers need to take a new look at the relation 
between labor and leisure? It is clear that a number of factors that policymakers can influence are 
related to the degree  of  associational  activity.  However,  as  long  as  we  do not  exactly  know  the 
mechanism between active membership and regional economic growth, it is too early to formulate 
clear policy implications.  
Obviously this study suffers from a number of limitations. First of all, lack of proper regional 
economic data forced us to use country relative regional products. Second, the period of observation is 
1950-1998, whereas the social capital data refer to 1990
17. Ideally, one would prefer social capital 
data referring to the start of the period of analyses. However, the earliest period of which we have 
data on our measurement of social capital (1981) is highly correlated to the 1990 data we used (over 
.90)
18.  
Future research should focus on the exact mechanisms through which social capital in terms 
of associational activity influences economic growth in the European regions. As we described in the 
section on group membership, theory argues that associational activity may promote the spillover of 
knowledge in networks and, second, may limit the costs of free riding through feelings of collectivity. 
However, there is no clear understanding how these mechanisms exactly work. More insight in these 
mechanisms is especially important for policymakers at the regional, national and European level. As 
we discussed above, the importance of (active) membership of all kinds of associations for regional 
economic growth may lead to a re-thinking of the relation between work and spare time. Related to 
this is the potentially important distinction between different types of social capital. In his most recent 
work  Putnam  (2000)  distinguishes  what  he  calls  ‘bridging  social  capital’  in  which  bonds  of 
connectedness are formed across diverse social groups, and ‘bonding social capital’ that cements only 
homogenous groups. Putnam clearly prefers the bridging type of social capital. Future research could 
follow Putnam’s line of thinking and try to find empirical evidence for the assumed positive effects of 
bridging social capital and the potentially negative effects of the bonding type of social capital.  
                                                           
17  As already mentioned we also performed regression analyses on shorter periods, for example the period 
1970-1998. Although we miss data for Spain in 1970 and the number of observations is reduced to 47, results 
show that model fit decreases slightly and significance levels generally go down, but overall conclusion on 
social capital holds.  
18 Knack and Keefer (1997, 1257) also discuss the stability in time of the trust measure and conclude that there 
is no severe noise in this survey-based measure of social capital. They base their conclusion on experiments 
conducted by the Reader’s Digest and reported in The Economist, June 22, 1996. In an experiment of 
“accidentally” lost wallets, the percentage of wallets returned in each country closely tracks the Values Survey 
measure of trust.   19
Nevertheless, before actual policy plans are developed, we need to know more about the 
mechanism between social capital and regional economic growth. The current attempts and activities 
of the Worldbank in the field of social capital and developing countries are worth mentioning. The 
importance of network relationships and the promotion of associational activity have led to a number 
of successful development  projects. Increasingly, the Worldbank  acknowledges that social capital 
may play a crucial role in the reduction of poverty and the success of development programs. Social 
capital is integrated into Worldbank policies in a number of ways
19. Nevertheless, these initiatives 
mainly focus on developing countries and the question remains if the relationship between social 
capital and economic growth is the same for rich and poor countries. 
As referred to in the introduction, a related policy question is if the lack or abundance of 
social capital influences the success of the regional development programs in the less favored regions 
of Europe. It would be interesting in future research to relate the degree of success of the Structural 
Funds of the EU in certain regions to the presence (or absence) of social capital.  
                                                           
19 For an overview of the Worldbank social capital initiatives we refer to 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/bank2.htm   20
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Region  NUTS1 
code 
1  Reg. Bruxelles-Cap.  BE1 
2  Vlaanderen  BE2 
3  Wallonie  BE3 
4  Baden-Württemberg  DE1 
5  Bayern  DE2 
6  Berlin  DE3 
7  Bremen  DE5 
8  Hamburg  DE6 
9  Hessen  DE7 
10  Niedersachsen  DE9 
11  Nordrhein-Westfalen  DEA 
12  Rheinland-Pfalz  DEB 
13  Saarland  DEC 
14  Schleswig-Holstein  DEF 
15  Noroeste  ES1 
16  Noreste  ES2 
17  Madrid  ES3 
18  Centro  ES4 
19  Este  ES5 
20  Sur  ES6 
21  Canarias  ES7 
22  Île de France  FR1 
23  Bassin Parisien  FR2 
24  Nord-Pas-de-Calais  FR3 
25  Est  FR4 
26  Ouest  FR5 
27  Sud-Ouest  FR6 
28  Centre-Est  FR7 
29  Méditerranée  FR8 
30  Nord Ovest  IT1 
31  Lombardia  IT2 
32  Nord Est  IT3 
33  Emilia-Romagna  IT4 
34  Centro  IT5 
35  Lazio  IT6 
36  Ambruzzo-Molise  IT7 
37  Campania  IT8 
38  Sud  IT9 
39  Sicilia  ITA 
40  Sardegna  ITB 
41  Noord-Nederland  NL1 
42  Oost-Nederland  NL2 
43  West-Nederland  NL3 
44  Zuid-Nederland  NL4 
45  North  UK1 
46  Yorkshire and Humberside  UK2 
47  East Midlands  UK3 
48  East Anglia  UK4 
49  South East  UK5 
50  South West  UK6 
51  West Midlands  UK7 
52  North West  UK8 
53  Wales  UK9 
54  Scotland  UKA 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 




Active group membership 




















Table 3a: Correlation table of social capital variables 
 
  Growth 
1950-1998 










-  .05  .16  .23*  .29*  .25* 
Trust    -  .42*  .52*  .21  .46* 
Putnam Groups      -  .72*  .70*  .79* 
Olson Groups        -  .69*  .79* 
Active  group 
membership 
        -  .85* 
Passive  group 
membership 
          - 
*, significant at 0.10. 
 
 
Table 3b: Correlation table of standard economic variables 
 
  Growth 
1950-1998 
Initial 
level  of 
welfare 
(1950) 




-  -.55*  -.15  .13  -.07  .05 
Initial level  of 
welfare (1950) 
  -  .29*  -.006  .35*  .17 
Schooling      -  -.31*  -.10  -.05 
Investment        -  -.03  -.19 
Agglomeration          -  -.19 
Spatial 
spillover 
          - 
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0.447 to 0.646  (10)
0.392 to 0.447  (11)
0.33  to 0.392  (11)
0.263 to 0.33   (11)
0.055 to 0.263  (11)  30
Figure  3: An overview of the  different  measures  of  social capital (+  or  – indicates direction of 












        Passive Group       Active Group 
membership (Groups +)   membership(A-Groups +) 
 
 
        Amongst others consists of: 
 
·  Putnam groups (P-Groups +) 
·  Olson groups (O-Groups -) 
   31




0.32 to 0.89  (12)
0.27 to 0.32  (11)
0.17 to 0.27  (11)
0.12 to 0.17   (7)
0.03 to 0.12  (13)  32






0.36 to 0.55  (10)
0.27 to 0.36  (11)
0.17 to 0.27  (10)
0.12 to 0.17  (12)
0  to 0.12  (11)  33
Figure 6: regional scores on Active group membership in Europe 
 
A-Groups
0.59 to 0.821  (11)
0.49 to 0.59   (9)
0.38 to 0.49   (12)
0.28 to 0.38   (11)
0.08 to 0.28   (11)  34
Table 4: Regression results 
 
Trust, Group Memberships and Regional Economic Performance, 1950-1998 
 
Model      1    2    3    4    5 
 
Dependent  
Variable            Growth 1950-1998 
 
Constant      -1.44**    -1.45**    -1.49**    -1.37**    -1.01* 
      (.623)    (.629)    (.611)    (.584)    (582) 
Initial level of welfare   -.971***    -.968***    -.938***    -.942***    -.969*** 
      (.201)    (.212)    (.196)    (.190)    (.196) 
Investment     .476**    .481**    .553***    .484**    .422** 
      (.203)    (.210)    (.201)    (.188)    (.184) 
Schooling      .527*    .518    .397    .449*    .569** 
      (.314)    (.329)    (.244)    (.258)    (.232) 
Agglomeration    .528***    .522**    .423**    .404**    .472** 
      (.195)    (.214)    (.204)    (.209)    (.197) 
Spatial spillover    .308***    .301**    .213**    .233**    .244** 
      (.093)    (.118)    (.103)    (.101)    (.097) 
Trust          .011     
          (.086)     
Putnam Groups            .007     
              (.063)     
Olson Groups            .119**     
              (.056)     
Passive group membership              .109** 
                  (0.41) 
Active group membership                  .175*** 
                      (.054) 
   
R-square      0.4089    0.4090    0.4673    0.4641    0.4813 
F-value      5.80    5.06    5.63    7.16    7.56 
CW-test      .6845    .6907    .4543    .8885    .8596 
VIF (Maximum)    1.49    1.53    2.45    1.50    1.49 
 
*Standard errors (White corrected) between parentheses. N = 54.  *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. CW test 
refers to the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. Values above 0.05 indicate heteroskedasticity is not problematic. VIF refers to 
Variance Inflation Factor and values above 10 are indications of multi-collinearity inflating the R-square. We considered log-specifications 
in our analysis. In case we do not take the log- specifications, results are not influenced. We also tested for country-specific effects and 
possible interaction effects. Results indicate that Olson Groups are not significant when country-specific effects are included. The overall 
conclusion on Group membership is not influenced. An overview of these additional tests can be found in a ‘statistical appendix’, which is 
available upon request.  35
 Figure 7: Coefficient and bands of Trust based on recursive OLS 
 


















Figure 8: Coefficient and bands of Active group membership based on recursive OLS 
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